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Collaterally Attacking Deportation Orders in Criminal
Prosecutions for Illegal Reentry Under Section 276 of
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
In recent years, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has re-
ported sharp increases in the number of deportable aliens apprehended. I Among
these aliens is a subgroup of illegal reentrants who are subject not only to rede-
portation,2 but also to criminal sanctions. Section 276 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 (INA)3 makes it a felony for an alien who has been ar-
rested and deported to reenter the United States without the express written con-
sent of the Attorney General. 4  The defendant in a section 276 criminal
prosecution may wish to collaterally challenge the underlying deportation order's
validity on the ground that it was issued without due process of law.
5
Because section 276 is silent regarding the permissibility of this collateral
attack defense, the courts have been left to decide whether the defense is avail-
able. In 1952 the Supreme Court of the United States, in United States v. Spector,
6
expressly reserved decision on whether the validity of an underlying order of de-
portation may be questioned in criminal prosecutions in which the prior deporta-
tion is an element.7 The Court suggested, however, that denial of such review
might infringe the defendant's constitutional rights. In a forceful dissent, Justices
Jackson and Frankfurter asserted that the sixth amendment requires a judicial
trial de novo to establish the deportability of the defendant.8
Despite this strong dissent, the federal courts of appeals have been reluctant
to allow collateral attacks and the Supreme Court has declined to hear the issue
since Spector. Recently, a number of courts of appeals have examined the ques-
tions Spector left unanswered. This examination has resulted in a growing trend
in certain circuits to allow limited collateral review. The divergent analyses and
conclusions of these courts have inevitably made the law in this area disparate
and confusing.
This note addresses the permissibility, basis, and standards of such collateral
attacks. Part I of this note discusses the case law concerning section 276 collat-
eral attacks. Part II analyzes the statute to determine congressional intent re-
garding the collateral attack and concludes that Congress intended to allow a
I CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY: 1952-1979 71 (1979).
2 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 [hereinafter cited as INA], § 242(), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(0
(1976).
3 Id § 276, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1976).
4 This offense is punishable by imprisonment for up to two years, or by fine of up to one thousand
dollars, or both. Id
5 In fact, this may be his only viable defense. One federal court of appeals has recently recognized a
defense based on the statute of limitations. In United States v. DiSantillo, 615 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1980), the
court held that a section 276 offense is complete when Immigration and Naturalization Service authorities
have record of the defendant's presence. When an alien is so "found," the five year statute of limitations
begins to run. Id But cf. United States v. Bruno, 328 F. Supp. 815 (W.D. Mo. 1971) (rejecting a statute of
limitations defense as "not only immaterial, but also without merit").
6 343 U.S. 169 (1952).
7 Id at 172.
8 Id at 177 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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limited collateral attack. Part III examines the type of review which should be
afforded and standards which should be used in that review.
I. Case Law Addressing Collateral Attacks Under Section 276
Since the Supreme Court declined in Spector to decide whether to allow col-
lateral review of the underlying deportation order, seven courts of appeals have
addressed the issue in section 276 prosecutions for illegal reentry.9 Among those
seven circuits, the approaches and analyses have varied greatly. The dissension
among the circuits goes far beyond the permissibility of such collateral review,
extending as well to the type and standard of review to be afforded. Before ex-
ploring these questions it is helpful to examine the divergent stances the several
circuits have taken, beginning with the most restrictive view (that of the Tenth
Circuit) and ending with the most permissive view (that of the Ninth Circuit).
A. Tenth Circuit
In Arriaga-Ranirez v. United States, 10 the first appellate court case to decide
the issue after Spector, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
held that a defendant could not collaterally attack a deportation in a section 276
prosecution.ii In so holding the court relied on two earlier cases, United States ex
rel. Rubzo v. Jordan i2 and United States ex rel. Bartsch v. Watkins. 13 These two cases
were not, however, section 276 criminal prosecutions but rather involved civil
redeportation proceedings. The cases held that in civil deportation proceedings
the illegality of an earlier deportation is no defense to redeportation since under
any circumstances the alien had no right to reenter.
Arriaga not only barred relitigating the issue of original deportability; it also
refused to allow pretrial judicial review of the record of the deportation hearing.
The court agreed that it was "sufficient to introduce the Warrant of Departation
and to prove its execution." 14 The court based its conclusions on its literal inter-
pretation of section 276's language "requir[ing] that it only be shown there was a
previous deportation."
Aiaga is the only Tenth Circuit case on point. Its heavy reliance on Jordan
and Watkins is unwarranted. The distinction between redeportation and felony
imprisonment for up to two years under section 276 indicates the inapplicability
of these two cases as binding precedent. Although Arriaga unequivocally fore-
closes all forms of collateral review, its authoritativeness is weakened by its age
and its questionable analysis.
B. Fzith Circuit
Unlike the Arriaga court, the Fifth Circuit engaged in a detailed analysis of
section 276 in United States v. Conzalez-Parra.i5 In this case, the Fifth Circuit held
9 The First, Fourth, Sixth, and District of Columbia Circuits have not dealt with this question.
10 325 F.2d 857 (10th Cir. 1963).
it Id at 859.
12 190 F.2d 573 (7th Cir. 1951).
13 175 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1949).
14 Id
15 438 F.2d 694 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1010 (1971). This statutory analysis is discussed fully
in the text accompanying notes 49-53 infra.
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that Congress intended to bar collateral attacks on deportation orders in section
276 prosecutions.16 The defendant was therefore not accorded a trial de novo to
relitigate his original deportability. The Gonzalez-Parra court recognized by way
of dictum, however, that in some other circumstances the difference between civil
judicial review' 7 immediately following an administrative deportation order and
a pretrial review in a later criminal prosecution may take on constitutional
dimensions. The court intimated that had the defendant not failed to invoke
administrative review on the merits of his deportation such constitutional dimen-
sions may have been presented and pretrial review by the judge required.' 8
C. Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit addressed the issue for the first time in Hernandez-Uribe v.
United States.19 The court refused to allow the defendant to relitigate the issue of
his alienage, which had been established by his voluntary plea of guilty in two
prior convictions under section 276. Although the defendant was denied a trial de
novo on the alienage element of the offense, the appellate court held he was never-
theless entitled to have the prior proceedings carefully examined in order to de-
termine whether a full and adequate hearing had been provided.20 Thus the
Eighth Circuit appears to recognize that some limited pretrial judicial review is
permissible.
D. Second Circuit
The Second Circuit left the issue of collateral attacks an open question in
United States v. Pereira.2 1 The defendant, Pereira, had been convicted of three
counts of burglary, two counts of theft, and one count of escape from imprison-
ment. He was ordered deported on five separate occasions, and had previously
been convicted of a section 276 violation. The court found that the defendant's
continuing and flagrant disregard of United States immigration laws, combined
with his failure to question the validity of his previously ordered deportations,
was overwhelming reason to affirm his conviction. The court confined its deci-
sion to these facts, expressly reserving decision on whether defendants in other
16 438 F.2d at 697.
17 See INA § 106, 8 U.S.C. § l105a (1976).
18 438 F.2d at 699.
19 515 F.2d 20 (8th Cir. 1971), crt. denied, 423 U.S. 1057 (1976). Four years earlier, a district court
within the Eighth Circuit had taken a very restrictive view of the collateral attack issue. United States v.
Bruno, 328 F. Supp. 815 (W.D. Mo. 1971). In Bruno, the defendant attempted to challenge the voluntari-
ness of a guilty plea to a narcotics conviction on which the deportation underlying his present § 276
prosecution was based. The district court held that the validity of the conviction underlying order of
deportation did not constitute a reviewable question in a § 276 prosecution and that the criminal trial
court "could not award a 'de novw hearing on the merits underlying his deportation'." 328 F. Supp. at 824
(quoting United States v. Heikkinen, 221 F.2d 890, 893 (7th Cir. 1955)).
In support of this holding, the Bruno court analogized the situation to escape from imprisonment
under a sentence which is later invalidated. The court asserted that in both instances the federal statutes
criminalized the conduct involved regardless of the propriety of the prior adjudications involved. The
crucial distinction that both Bruno and Arriaga ignore is the important differences between .criminal and
civil prosecutions. An escaping convict has previously been afforded all the safeguards accompanying a
criminal prosecution, such as trial by jury, appointment of counsel if necessary, and the requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to all elements of his offense. The § 276 defendant is guaranteed none
of these safeguards in his deportation hearing.
20 515 F.2d at 22.
21 574 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1978).
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situations could collaterally attack a conviction underlying the deportation on
which a section 276 prosecution is based. 22
E. Seventh Circuit
Although the cases in the Seventh Circuit have indicated a willingness to
allow collateral attacks in section 276 prosecutions, the question has not been
squarely presented.2 3 United States ex rel. Rubio v. Jordan24 involved an alien,
whom the government sought to redeport, seeking habeus corpus review of a
prior deportation. The court held that in this proceeding a collateral attack
against the prior deportation order would be permissible only if the court found
that a "gross miscarriage of justice" '2 5 would otherwise result.
In United States v. Heikkinen,26 the Seventh Circuit held that the "validity of
the underlying deportation order is an inescable ingredient" of the offense of
willful failure to deport following an order of deportation.2 7 Consequently, the
court found that the defendant was entitled "to have the trial judge ascertain
whether [the defendant] was accorded due process before the INS authority;
whether the rules were adhered to and pertinent statutory provisions followed."' 28
The court ruled, however, that he was not entitled to a trial de novo. Neither
Jordan nor Heikkinen was a section 276 prosecution, but the greater similarity of
illegal reentry 29 to willful failure to depart30 than to "redeportation" suggests
that Heikkinen, rather than Jordan, would be followed in a section 276 prosecu-
tion. Both section 276 (illegal reentry) and section 242(e) (failure to depart) in-
volve criminal prosecutions based on elements of previously ordered deportation
and subsequent physical presence in the United States. The principal distinction
between the two situations is merely having departed for section 276 and not
having departed for section 242(e).
F. Third Circuit
The Third Circuit was the first to allow collateral attack on underlying de-
portation orders in section 276 prosecutions. In United States V. Bowles,3 t the court
found that "[w]hen Congress made use of the word 'deported' in [section 276], it
22 Like Hernandez-Un'be, Pereira established a less restrictive view of the collateral attack question than
previous lower courts had taken. Prior to Pereira, in United States v. Mohammed, 372 F. Supp. 1048
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York found that the
defendant was not entitled to have his section 276 prosecution stayed while he sought administrative relief.
The Mohammed court held that the section 276 defendant was absolutely foreclosed from collaterally at-
tacking the original deportation order. Id at 1049. Thus, the Pereira decision marks the present trend
within the circuits toward allowing collateral attacks.
23 Although technically the Seventh Circuit has not ruled on the collateral attack question in a § 276
prosecution, other circuits have interpreted the 7th Circuit case law as answering it affirmatively. See, e.g.,
United States v. Dekermenjian, 508 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1974) (the Ninth Circuit, still refusing to rule on the
issue, viewed the Seventh as well as the Third Circuit as already allowing the collateral attack).
24 190 F.2d 573 (7th Cir. 1951).
25 Id at 576.
26 240 F.2d 94 (7th Cir. 1957), reu'don othergrounds, 355 U.S. 273 (1958); United States v. Heikkinen,
221 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1955).
27 221 F.2d at 892.
28 Id at 893.
29 INA § 276, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1976).
30 Id § 242(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1152(e) (1976).
31 331 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1964).
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meant 'deported according to law'."'3 2 The legality of the deportation is to be
decided by the court and may be attacked "on at least two fundamental and
limited grounds": (1) no basis in fact, and (2) no warrant in law. 33
In United States v. Floulis,34 the United States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania followed the "Third Circuit rule that the defendant in a
prosecution under [section 276] may collaterally attack the validity of a prior
deportation to show that he was not deported 'according to law'."'35 Floulis also
indicated that mere violation of an INS regulation is not per se a violation of due
process rendering the deportation unlawful.3 6
G. Ninth Circuit
The greatest number of collateral attacks to deportation orders has occurred
in the Ninth Circuit.37 The Ninth Circuit first allowed the collateral attack in
United States v. Gasca-Kraft,38 in which it held that because "[a] material element
of the offense defined by [section 276] is a lawful deportation," the defendant
"was entitled to put in issue the legality of his [prior] deportation . . ." on due
process grounds.39 Subsequently, in United States v. Calderon-Medina,40 the Ninth
Circuit expanded the grounds for attack and set forth standards of review based
on violations of INS regulations. These standards require the defendant to
demonstrate that the government violated an INS regulation which protects the
defendant's interests and that the violation prejudiced those interests. 41 Thus the
Ninth Circuit has adopted an approach under which collateral attacks are widely
permitted.42
As this brief examination of the case law demonstrates, the status of collat-
eral attacks on deportation orders in section 276 prosecutions differs significantly
among the federal appellate courts. The courts disagree on the basic question of
permissibility and those courts which do allow collateral attacks engage in differ-
ent types of review, recognize different grounds for attack, and apply different
standards. The sections to follow consider these differences and suggest a solu-
tion to the problem.
32 Id at 749.
33 Id at 750.
34 457 F. Supp. 1350 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
35 Id at 1354 (citing Bowles, 331 F.2d 742).
36 457 F. Supp. at 1354-55.
37 See, e.g., United States v. Gasca-Kraft, 522 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Barraza-Leon,
575 F.2d 218 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Guerra de Aguilera, 600 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Vega-Mejia, 611 F.2d 751 (9th
Cir. 1979); United States v. Lagarda-Aguilar, 617 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Rangel-
Gonzales, 617 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Bejar-Matrecios, 618 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Calles-Pineda, 627 F.2d 976 (9th Cir. 1980).
38 522 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1975). Prior to this case, the Ninth Circuit had found it unnecessary under
the circumstances of earlier cases to resolve the collateral attack issue. See United States v. Dekermenjian,
508 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1974).
39 522 F.2d at 152-53 (italics in original). See a/so United States v. Barraza-Leon, 575 F.2d 218 (9th
Cir. 1979).
40 591 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1979).
41 These standards, however, were based at least in part on a case which was later reversed. United
States v. Caceres, 545 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1976), reo'd, 440 U.S. 741 (1979).
42 For a detailed discussion of the Ninth Circuit's standards of review, see text accompanying notes 92-
95 supra.
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II. Statutory Interpretation
The permissibility of collateral attacks essentially depends upon the view a
court takes of the statutory requirement of having "been arrested and de-
ported."'43 The courts have interpreted this requirement in three ways: (1) as
requiring that the defendant's deportability be reestablished to the jury in the
section 276 prosecution; (2) as requiring that the trial judge determine the legal-
ity of the deportation before trial; or (3) as merely requiring that an executed
deportation order be introduced into evidence and prohibiting any attack on the
order. These views are represented by the opinions in the Spector dissent, 44 Gasca-
KrafI45 and Arnaga-Ramirez,46 respectively. These three views will hereinafter be
referred to by these case names.
The first inquiry in interpreting section 276 is whether section 276 purports
to punish the unauthorized reentry of anyone previously deported or only the
reentry of those "lawfully" deported. At first glance, it would seem Congress
intended to bar collateral review in section 276 prosecutions. Section 276 makes
no mention of collateral attacks. Its language indicates only that the defendant
must have been arrested and deported. No express reference to the validity of the
deportation or of the arrest is made. If any contrary intention is to be found it
must come from other sections of the INA. The Gonzalez-Parra court looked to
INA section 106, 4 7 which provides for judicial review of deportations ordered
under INA section 242.48 The Gonzalez-Parra court's analysis of section 106 led it
to conclude that courts may review an order of deportation only if the alien has
exhausted the administrative remedies available to him under the immigration
laws and has not yet departed from the United States.4 9 This situation arises in
three ways: (1) if still in custody, the alien may obtain judicial review of the
order by habeus corpus; 50 (2) whether in custody or not, he is entitled to civil
judicial review in the federal courts of appeals if he files for review within six
months of the order;5 1 and (3) in criminal prosecutions under section 242 for
willful failure to depart ,or for violation of supervisory regulations, the defendant
may obtain pretrial.judicial review.52 Apparently applying the maxim that the
expression of one thing is the exclusion of another, the Gonzalez-Parra court in-
ferred "that Congress intended to bar collateral attacks on deportation orders in
prosecutions under [section 276]. "53
Although section 106(a) provides that the foregoing procedures "shall be the
sole and exclusive procedures for . . .the judicial review of all final orders of
deportation. . . ,,,54 a legislative intent to prohibit collateral review of deporta-
43 INA § 276, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1976).
44 343 U.S. at 174 (Jackson, J., dissenting). See text accompanying notes 63-64 infra.
45 522 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1975). See text accompanying notes 37-42 supra.
46 325 F.2d 694 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1010 (1971). See text accompanying notes 10-14 supra.
47 INA § 106, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (1976).
48 Id § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1976).
49 I. § 106(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) (1976).
50 Id § 106(a)(9), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(9) (1976).
51 Id § 106(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1976).
52 Id § 106(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(6) (1976).
53 United States v. Gonzalez-Parra, 438 F.2d 694, 697 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1010 (1971).
54 INA § 106(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1976). The legislative history of § 106 similarly states its pur-
pose "is to create a single, separate statutory form of judicial review of administrative orders of deporta-
tion .. " [1961] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2966.
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tions underlying section 276 prosecutions is less than clear. There is no indica-
tion in section 106 or its legislative history that Congress ever considered its
applicability to section 276 prosecutions. The author of section 106 clearly stated
that that section's purpose was "to put an end to the mockery of our judicial
process and to the perversion of the constitutional right of 'due process' through
which the worst alien element, the subversive, the gangsters, and the racketeers
are able to prolong their stay in this country." 55 Permitting collateral review of
deportations in prosecutions for illegal reentry would not hinder this stated pur-
pose. Stopping "protracted litigations obviously conducted for the sole purpose
of delaying deportation," 56 the problem addressed by section 106, is far different
from the problem of providing judicial review of a deportation which comprises
an essential element of a criminal prosecution. "[A]n amendment must be inter-
preted in terms of the mischief it was intended to rectify."5 7
The pretrial judicial review provided in section 106 may well have been
simply a legislative response to the view of the dissenting justices in Spector that
there might be a constitutional right to judicial review, and to the prior holding
of United States v. Heikkinen expressly providing for pretrial judicial review in pros-
ecutions fQr willful failure to depart. Section 106's language may have only men-
tioned expressly those two criminal offenses because they appear within section
242, the section to which the section 106 amendment was directed. The failure
of section 106 to expressly encompass section 276 prosecutions may have resulted
from a failure to look beyond section 242. There is no apparent reason why
Congress would consciously prohibit collateral review in section 276. The offense
prohibited by Section 276 is essentially the same offense which is prohibited by
section 242(e)-failure to depart-which is expressly provided with pretrial judi-
cial review. Both statutes punish aliens for being found in the United States after
having been ordered deported. The only essential distinction is that the section
276 violator crosses the border and then returns to the United States, while the
section 242(e) violator fails to cross the border at all. The substantial similarity
between the two offenses indicates that had Congress considered the sections to-
gether it would have intended defendants in section 276 prosecutions to be ac-
corded the same pretrial judicial review procedure it expressly provided
defendants charged with section 242 criminal offenses.
Finally, and most importantly, "[i]t is elementary law that every statute is to
be read in light of the Constitution.15 8 When a statute is susceptible of two inter-
pretations, one constitutional and the other unconstitutional, the statute must be
interpreted so as to avoid constitutional infirmities. 59 Because an assumption
that Congress intended to bar all collateral judicial review in section 276 cases
raises constitutional concerns, every effort should be made to interpret the section
as allowing collateral review.
If Congress intended to bar section 276 collateral review, the constitutional-
55 197 CONG. REc. 12175 (1961).
56 [1961] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2967.
57 In re Letters Rogatory, 385 F.2d 1017, 1020 (2d Cir. 1067) (construing amendment to federal stat-
ute).
58 McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102, 112 (1898).
59 American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90 (1946); Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v. McAd-
ory, 325 U.S. 450 (1945); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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ity of the section is questionable. The constitutionality of prohibiting collateral
review has been addressed by two Supreme Court cases, Wong Wing v. United
States60 and Yakus v. United States,6 1 which deal with sixth amendment and due
process considerations respectively.
62
A. Sirth Amendment Considerations
The Supreme Court in Spector recognized the possible constitutional infir-
mity in a statute which affords the criminal defendant no opportunity to have
the trial court pass on the validity of his deportation, but declined to address the
issue since it was neither raised nor necessary for decision of the case.63 A vigor-
ous dissent by Justices Jackson and Frankfurter, relying on Wong Wlng, took up
the issue and concluded that a criminal immigration statute punishing illegal
presence violated the sixth amendment "unless provision were made that the fact
of [the defendant's] guilt should first be established by a judicial trial."' 64 This
dissent emphasized the distinction between a civil administrative deportation
and a subsequent criminal prosecution that relies upon the deportation as an
element of the offense. Aspects of the administrative hearing procedure which
produces the deportation order raise serious doubt as to the efficacy of the consti-
tutional safeguards protecting the future defendant. 65 The first and most obvi-
ous discrepancy is that elements of criminal offenses must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, while the preponderance of the evidence standard prevails in
civil deportation hearings. 66 A second difference is that although the indigent
defendant is entitled to representation by appointed counsel at the criminal hear-
ing, he has no such right in a civil deportation hearing.67 A third and shocking
difference between a deportation hearing and a criminal proceeding is that in the
former, administrative officers may act as prosecutor and judge and sometimes,
in effect, even as defense counsel. 68 The crucial distinction, however, relied upon
by Justice Jackson in his dissent in Spector, is that a statute which affords the
60 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
61 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
62 These two cases were separately raised and relied upon by the Spector dissent and by Gonzalez-Parra
with different results.
63. 343 U.S. at 172.
64 343 U.S. at 175 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (quoting Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 237).
65 See Fragomen, The "Uncivil" Nature of Deportation: Fourth and Ftjh Amendment Rights and the Exclusion-
ay Rule, 45 BROOKLYN L. REv. 29 (1978), for discussion of the "quasi-criminal aspects of deportation
proceedings." The author concludes that full due process safeguards should be accorded aliens in deporta-
tion proceedings.
66 Not only is the burden of proof only to a preponderance of the evidence under INA § 291, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1361 (1976), but the alien also bears the burden of proving the time, place and manner of his other entry.
If the alien fails to meet this burden, he or she is presumed to be in the United States illegally.
67 INA § 242(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2) (1976). See genera4'y Appleman, Right to Counselin Deportation
Proceedings, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 130 (1976). The significance of having been represented by counsel at
the hearing which produced the deportation order underlying a § 276 prosecution is examined in Com-
ment, Collateral Attacks on Deportation Orders in Prosecutians for Illegal Reent.7, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 83 (1981).
68 INA § 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1976). This proceeding has been termed a "kangaroo court" by
some members of Congress, who note that "[als a matter of fact, the entire record is compiled by the
hearing officer himself who also supplies certain evidence ... after the hearing is closed." 107 CONG.
REC. 12179 (1961). In the same debate over approval of § 106, a report of the Committee on American
Citizenship of the New York County Lawyer's Association was presented which observed that "[i]n a wide
range of deportation cases, the decision of the special inquiry officer is by regulation made final. . . .Far
from being a quasi-judicial officer, the special inquiry officer is part and parcel of the Immigration and
Naturalization Services and is under its control." Id at 12181.
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criminal defendant no opportunity to have the trial court pass on the validity of
his deportation order "sever[s] the issue of unlawful presence for administrative
determination" so as to avoid a jury trial by making the administrative determi-
nation conclusive upon the criminal trial court. According to Justice Jackson,
this manner of establishing the elements of a criminal offense deprives the alien
of his constitutional right to a trial by jury. 69
The difficulty with applying Justice Jackson's reasoning to section 27670 lies
in treating the "prior deportation" requirement as a subtle severance of the
deeper issue of illegal presence. In determining whether a sixth amendment vio-
lation exists, the question is whether the gravamen of a section 276 violation is
really illegal presence or merely unauthorized reentry following deportation, as
the statutory language suggests. Under Justice Jackson's construction, section
276 definitely entails a sixth amendment infirmity. Yet, since Spector, the
Supreme Court has not spoken to Justice Jackson's position and even the courts
advocating the Gasca-Kraf view have refused to go so far as to adopt it in full.
The courts of appeals seem to agree that Congress intended to criminalize the
unauthorized reentry of prevously deported aliens. This is also suggested by the
analogy in United States v. Bruno7 1 likening a section 276 prosecution founded on
an unlawful deportation to an escape from imprisonment prosecution based on a
sentence later invalidated.72
Like statutes criminalizing escapes from imprisonment, section 276 may be
intended to penalize the conduct it prohibits regardless of the validity of the prior
proceeding. This analogy supports the conclusion that section 276 punishes un-
authorized reentry rather than illegal presence. Although it avoids the sixth
amendment issue raised by Justice Jackson, this construction of section 276 gives
rise to a different constitutional question: whether use of an administrative deter-
mination in a criminal prosecution, without opportunity for judicial review at
the criminal prosecution as to its legality, violates the defendant's due process
rights.
B. Due Process Considerations
A due process question was raised in a procedurally similar case, Yakus v.
United States,73 upon which the Gonzalez-Parra court relied. Yakus involved the
Emergency Price Control Act of 194274 which administratively prescribed maxi-
mum prices of certain goods sold in the United States. This Act, like INA section
106, provided an exclusive mode of review culminating in judicial review by the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held defendants statutorily barred from
69 343 U.S. at 177 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
70 Spector involved criminal prosecution for willful failure to depart following an order of deportation.
After the Spector decision and possibly as a consequence of it, Congress enacted § 106 of the Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1 105a, which provides for judicial review of deportation orders in such criminal prosecutions.
71 See note 19 supra.
72 "The [section 2761 situation is analogous to escape from imprisonment under a sentence which is
later invalidated. In those cases, it is held that the later invalidation of the sentence and underlying
conviction is of 'no legal consequence' because '[a]t the time of his escape, the defendant was a federal
prisoner in custody by virtue of process issued under the laws of the United States... '." 328 F. Supp. at
825 (citatons omitted).
73 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
74 Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-421,56 Stat. 23 (omitted from 1976 codifica-
tion at 50 U.S.C. §§ 901-46).
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collaterally attacking the administrative price determinations in their subsequent
criminal prosecutions for violating the prescribed price controls. The Court con-
cluded that "[s]uch a procedure, so long as it affords to those affected a reason-
able opportunity to be heard and present evidence, does not offend against due
process."
' 75
Although Yakus was deemed dispositive by the Gon alez-Parra court, it is dis-
tinguishable on several grounds from cases involving section 276 prosecutions.
First, Yakus was decided in a time of war, and the Court recognized the Price
Control Act was a "war-time emergency measure" needed to protect our national
security from the danger of inflation.76 More importantly, however, the nature
of the administrative determinations involved in Yakus renders the principle
enunciated in that case inapposite to section 276 collateral review. As noted by
Justice Jackson in his dissent in Spector, "[ilt must be remembered that the depor-
tation proceeding is an exercise of adjudicative, not rule-making power." 77 The
scope of review mandated by the due process clause is different where the admin-
istrative agency is exercising an adjudicative as opposed to a rule-making func-
tion. In Provost v. Betit, 78 the court recognized that
[tjhe distinction is important. As the terms imply, exercise of the rule-making func-
tion of an agency is akin to legislative enactment, albeit delegated. Exercise of the
adjudicative function is analogous to a judicial proceeding in which particular facts
are measured against legislative standards of uniform applicability. The scope of
judicial review mandated by the due process clause is of necessity different in the two
cases.
79
Yakus involved a rule-making determination tantamount to legislation. In a
due process challenge to this type of administrative determination, the court is
required to examine only its constitutionality, not its wisdom.8 0 In section 276
prosecutions, however, the administrative determination is judicial in nature and
therefore "due process requires some or all of the procedural safeguards (depend-
ing upon the nature of the proceeding) which have been found essential to the
fair and equitable treatment of individuals.""' Thus, in cases where administra-
tive determinations are judicial in nature, due process requirements assume
greater significance.8 2 When these civil determinations take on a criminal char-
75 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 433 (1944).
76 The Court stated:
In considering these asserted hardships, it is appropriate to take into account the purposes of
the Act and the circumstances attending its enactment and application of a war-time emer-
gency measure. The Act was adopted January 30, 1942, shortly after our declaration of war
against Germany and Japan, when it was common knowledge, as is emphasized by the legisla-
tive history of the Act that there was grave danger of war-time inflation and the disorganization
of our economy from excessive price rises. Congress was under pressing necessity of meeting this
danger by a practicable and expeditious means which would operate with such promptness,
regularity and consistency as would minimize the sudden development of commodity price dis-
parities, accentuated by commodity shortages occasioned by war.
Id at 431-32.
77 United States v. Spector, 343 U.S. 169, 179 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
78 326 F. Supp. 920 (D. Vt. 1971).
79 Id at 923.
80 Id (citing Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819)).
81 Id
82 Id
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acter or suggest criminal implications,8 3 fundamental fairness requires some form
of collateral review. Prohibiting collateral attacks of rule-making administrative
determinations, as in Yakus, poses much less of a due process problem than
prohibiting collateral attacks on judicial administrative determinations such as
the deportation order relied upon in section 276 prosecutions. Prohibiting the
latter should be considered violative of the broader procedural safeguards due
process requires in such situations.
III. Type and Standard of Review
In view of the lack of any clear expression of congressional intent, the courts
should interpret INA sections 276 and 106 as allowing sufficient collateral review
to avoid any constitutional infirmity.8 4 This requires two steps. First, the section
106 amendment must be interpreted as not having been intended to cover section
276 collateral review. Second, section 276 must be construed in accordance with
the construction applied by the Third and Ninth Circuits. These courts, appar-
ently realizing the constitutional implications of a contrary interpretation,8 5 have
construed section 276 as implicitly requiring lawful deportation.
Under this statutory interpretation due process requires, at a minimum, pre-
trial review of the deportation hearing record by the trial judge. Such a review
would leave the statute intact and avoid any due process infirmities. Pretrial
review is also minimally disruptive to the trial process, especially as compared to
a trial de novo on the validity of the defendant's prior deportation. This is the
type of review afforded by courts following the Gasca-Krql view and is very simi-
lar to the scheme of review section 106 provides for section 242 criminal prosecu-
tions. Even the relatively restrictive Eighth Circuit, while prohibiting a trial de
novo on the issue of deportability, indicated in Hernandez-Uribe that the defendant
was entitled to have the prior proceedings carefully examined to assure that a full
and adequate hearing was provided.86
The basic issue on review, of course, is whether the substantive and procedu-
ral requirements of due process were satisfied. The Third Circuit has divided this
into two grounds for collateral attack: (1) whether there was a basis in fact for
the deportation, 87 and (2) whether there was a warrant in law for the deporta-
tion.88 Other courts have spoken generally of a "full and adequate hearing." 89
Section 106 has a different standard which could be applicable by implication in
view of the similarity of the offense of illegal reentry to the offense of failure to
departP° The validity of a deportation order challenged under section 106(a) (6)
turns on whether the deportation record considered as a whole is "supported by
83 For a discussion of criminal implications of deportation hearings in section 276 prosecutions, see the
text accompanying notes 54-57 supra.
84 See note 59 supra.
85 See United States v. Bowles, 331 F.2d 742, 749 (3d Cir. 1974) ("A serious constitutional issue might
be presented under certain circumstances but insofar as we can see none is present nor do any lurk in the
case at bar at least under the interpretation which we have put upon the statute. . ...
86 Hernandez-Uribe v. United States, 515 F.2d 20, 22 (5th Cir. 1975).
87 No basis in fact means that there was no factual basis for deportation in the files of the Immigration
Board.
88 No Warrant in Law means that the defendant was not legally deportable.
89 Hernandez-Uribe v. United States, 515 F.2d 20, 22 (5th Cir. 1975).
90 See text accompanying notes 57-58 supra.
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reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence." 9' This standard appears
equally adequate.
Based on its requirement of lawful deportation, 92 the Ninth Circuit has re-
cently developed a standard of review even broader than that required by due
process considerations. In United States v. Calderon-Medina ,9 the court held that
violation of an INS administrative regulation may render the deportation inva-
lid. 94 In determining the deportation order's validity, the court established a
two-step test requiring that (1) the regulation serve a purpose of benefit to the
defendant, and (2) the violation actually prejudice the defendant's interests in-
tended to be protected. 95 This test, although derived from the court's interpreta-
tion of a requirement of lawful deportation, is not necessary to satisfy the due
process concerns towards which that interpretation was originally directed.
IV. Conclusion
Although the sixth amendment objections to section 276 are quieted by in-
terpreting the statute as aimed at reentry rather than presence, the additional
constitutional concern of due process remains. In light of the greater scope of
review mandated by the due process clause regarding administrative determina-
tions which are adjudicative in function and the minimal disruptiveness of pre-
trial review, such judicial review should be a constitutional requisite in section
276 prosecutions. To uphold the constitutionality of section 276 a court must
recognize that Congress intended to require a lawful deportation. Courts there-
fore should be not only permitted but required to allow defendants to collaterally
attack the deportation order underlying their prosecution for illegal reentry.
Shawn C Conway
91 INA § 106(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(6) (1976).
92 See note 39 supra.
93 591 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1979).
94 Id
95 Id
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